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Will the Real Henry Kissinger
Please Stand Up?
Leonid Heretz
Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin
Press, 2014).
onsider the design of the cover of Henry
Kissinger’s most recent book. How many
individuals’ names could stand up to a
placement and juxtaposition like that? Thanks to
half a century of promotion, Henry Kissinger’s
can. Blurbs on the back of the book remind us of
the author’s “intimate firsthand knowledge” of
the high and mighty, his ability to offer “incisive
strategic analysis” spanning continents and centuries
and, not least, his role in shaping foreign policy and
international relations. “No one can lay claim to so
much influence … over the past 50 years,” according
to the authoritative Financial Times. It is no secret that
Kissinger is getting on in years, so we might hope that
World Order is his political testament, a place where he
finally tells the inside story of why things are the way
they are, and how they might be fixed.

C

Fittingly enough for the man who is
credited with bringing Realpolitik to the
rubes, Kissinger begins with a lengthy
disquisition on the grand old European
system of Richelieu (“sophisticated
and ruthless”) and Bismarck (“master
manipulator of the balance of power”).
While most of the world has had too
much order (empires with universal
claims) or too little (authorities incapable of exercising control beyond the
local level), Europe for a time had the
optimal order: mutually recognized
sovereign states that enjoyed unchallenged control over their own territories and pursued secular, defined goals
through rational diplomacy and limited
warfare. Regrettably, the European
system drove itself into the ground in
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combining “globe-spanning ambitions” with “the insecurities of the parvenu” (55). The Middle East supplies
the “stern landscape [from which] have
issued conquerors and prophets holding
aloft banners of universal aspirations”
(96). China is the Middle Kingdom,
viewing itself as the center of a “universal hierarchy” (213). India, secure in its
“timeless matrix,” measures the comings and goings of empires and epochs
“against the perspective of the infinite”
(193). America is characterized by an
irresistible combination of pragmatism
and idealism.
Most of what Kissinger writes about the
contemporary scene would be familiar
to anyone who follows the news. His
recommendations are also unremarkable, although he does throw in bits
of his trademark Machiavellianism
(for example, he suggests dumping
responsibility for Afghanistan on that
country’s neighbors). In recent years,
Kissinger has positioned himself as the
godfather (in the intellectual rather
than the organized crime sense) of the
‘realist’ school of foreign policy, which
argues for restraint and against the
militant interventionism of the neoconservative and ‘humanitarian’ factions.

the world wars, and that happened just
before it was imperfectly established in
the rest of the world during decolonization. According to Kissinger, the challenge and tragedy of our times is that
there is no international order, and “if
order cannot be achieved by consensus
or imposed by force, it will be wrought,
at disastrous and dehumanizing cost,
from the experience of chaos” (129).
To those who have forgotten (or never
took) their old-fashioned Western Civ
or International Relations courses, all
of this might sound rather profound, as
might Kissinger’s observations about
the essential characteristics of the different parts of the world beyond Europe:
Russia, ominously (or is it comically?) styling itself the Third Rome,
39

Unfortunately, there is little of this
Kissingerian realism in World Order, and
most of the book reads like the op-ed
pages of the Wall Street Journal or the
Washington Post. This is particularly
true of the treatment of America’s role.
Kissinger raises hopes that he will offer
a realist critique of U.S. policy when
he gives Woodrow Wilson credit for
bequeathing “to the twentieth century’s decisive power an elevated foreign
policy doctrine unmoored from a sense
of history or geopolitics” (269). Instead,
he provides a reverent apology for successive U.S. administrations, justifying
virtually all of the major decisions made
up to the invasions and occupations
of Afghanistan and Iraq (but not the
‘nation-building’ that followed), and
showing that Wilsonianism is actually
a good thing because it has inspired
Americans to achieve even more than
they would have otherwise.
By way of consolation, the book is full
of Kissingerian aphorisms struggling to
be born. “For nations, history plays the
role that character confers on human
beings” (167) and “[I]n international
affairs, a reputation for reliability is a
more important asset than demonstrations of tactical cleverness” (73) are just
two of many. Kissinger was on TV a
lot when I was a child, so I can see his
deadpan expression and hear his grave

monotone when I read “[H]istory punishes strategic frivolity sooner or later”
(80). We are no longer in the realm of
“Power is the greatest aphrodisiac,”
but that would be a lot to expect of a
91-year old.
Inspired by this example, I will try
my own hand at maxim-making: “A
statesman is not a pedant.” World Order
is shot through with sloppy quotation
and even contains factual errors. To
cite only two of them: first, Kissinger
helps us appreciate the role of the Saudi
king by likening it to that of the Holy
Roman Emperor in his capacity as
“Defender of the Faith.” That honorific belongs, of course, to the English
monarch, and does not illuminate
Middle Eastern affairs in the slightest.
Elsewhere, we learn that Eugene of
Savoy led a European army that saved
Vienna and Europe from the Turks in
1683. Prince Eugene of Savoy, King
Jan Sobieski of Poland—what difference does it make? The confusion is
very roughly equivalent to saying that
George Patton and not John Pershing
led the American Expeditionary Force
to France in World War I. It would
not matter that much if these were the
memoirs of a practical politician who
makes no pretense of intellectualism,
but Kissinger bases his authority on
a stereotypically Central European
erudition and precision.

Another aphorism that suggests itself:
“A statesman never plays it straight.”
Kissinger gets very murky and uncharacteristically self-effacing when he
comes to the Nixon and Ford administrations, the only time when he
actually had any power. This is
how he deals with the invasion of
Cambodia and the escalation of
bombing in North Vietnam (which
are nowhere mentioned explicitly):
“The military actions that President
Nixon ordered, and that as his National
Security Advisor I supported, together
with the policy of diplomatic f lex
ibility, brought about a settlement
in 1973” (301).
It would seem that Henry Kissinger is
not yet ready to give up his secrets, at
least not in a setting where an obscure
college professor might get at them.
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